Baqer Darwish
Chairman of the Bahrain Forum for Human Rights

From the outset of the 14 February movement in 2011, questions began to arise about the future of political life in Bahrain, as well as about the path required to resolve the consequences of the conflict whenever genuine and serious conditions for national reconciliation might become available.
The authorities chose to prioritize a security-driven approach in addressing the multiple crises, in deliberate denial of the reality of the crisis and in entrenching a doctrine of political retaliation against every voice and movement that expressed rejection of the prevailing repressive policies.
For this reason, when the idea of establishing the Commission of Inquiry chaired by Professor Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni emerged - given the scale of violations across various regions of Bahrain - the state did not turn it into a serious starting point for the immediate launch of transitional justice. Instead, it succeeded in generating tactics of delay: committees followed by committees, and evasive reports issued by state institutions, supported by a media machine and diplomatic activity. It should be noted, however, that success in producing delay tactics does not mean success in promoting the official narrative.
In general, the years passed and violations multiplied. The security mindset worked to widen the scope of abuses and expand the arenas of retaliation - whether through arbitrary arrests or unfair trials - going as far as targeting the pillars of strength within Bahrain's political and religious communities. Ward 15, and other wards, in Jau Central Prison were not the only site of prolonged punishment. Revocation of citizenship, dissolution of political societies, and, most dangerously, the slide toward political isolation constituted a complex misstep that undermined any prospects for even partial easing of the domestic situation. (We are not speaking here of major settlements; the state believes it has moved beyond the opposition and closed the file permanently.)
Overall, violations and abuses have been diverse, and they do not stop at the gates of political detention. The victims harmed by the security-driven approach are numerous. Here, there is also criticism directed at the human rights community for failing to give certain areas of violations the attention they deserve in terms of exposure.
We must ask: what has been accomplished in uncovering the truth about the reality of violations in Bahrain? This question requires substantial discussion before speaking of accountability, reparations, and the nature of the institutional reforms required.
The process of uncovering the truth requires an institutional process covering more than fifteen years, and it must not stop at the issues that merely capture public attention. For example: what about violations related to the legal status of those whose citizenship was revoked, reparations and their repercussions on families, and the broader social consequences? What about the suspension of promotions in the public sector for political reasons? The cumulative impact on victims of years of lost income? The psychological effects on victims' children and affected family members?
I firmly believe-and further discussion is needed-that if a political solution is ever reached, it must be accompanied by a proper transitional justice process. This process should align with Bahrain's societal realities and particular context, in order to achieve sustainable solutions for addressing the harm caused by official abuses and for turning the page on the past. Releasing detainees and issuing certificates of good conduct will not be sufficient. Transitional justice must fundamentally reshape the framework. At a minimum, senior officials implicated in abuses should appear before the courts, and legislation must include clear safeguards to prevent the recurrence of such tragic patterns.